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In March, France made a controversial move and became the first country in the
world to explicitly ban research on individual judicial behaviour. It is now a criminal
offence to ‘evaluate, analyse, compare or predict’ the behaviour of individual judges.
The maximum sentence is a remarkable five years in prison.
This new harsh regulation was triggered in part by the use of machine learning
to compare the behaviour of judges in asylum cases – a study which found great
discrepancies among individual justices. Yet, the new law is akin to using a
sledgehammer to crack a nut. It bans effectively all forms of analysis of individual
judges, and not just big data-driven social scientific inquiry but also doctrinal legal
analysis. The result is a flagrant violation of the freedom of expression, represents
an affront to basic values of academic freedom, and disregards basic principles of
the rule of law. It is moreover likely a violation of fundamental EU law but we leave
that for another post.
Background
It is perhaps somewhat ironic that the ban comes after France had taken bold
strides towards digitalising court judgements, thereby paving the road for data-driven
engagement with French jurisprudence. The availability of French case-law in digital
form coincides with the boom in legal tech companies; and empirical legal research
using such data has positioned France at the frontier of computational analysis of
law. Making case-law easily available also speaks to fundamental concerns about
the rule of law, including transparency of the law and a healthy scrutiny of the court
system. No one is above the law, including the courts.
The turn-around on these matters has apparently been in the making for some
time. In 2016, a lawyer and machine learning expert, Michaël Benesty, published
an analysis of French asylum decisions. The results were striking. Some judges
rejected almost all asylum requests; others had a very low ratio of rejection. Given
the large sample size and the random distribution of cases amongst judges, the
evidence of judicial bias was compelling. Benesty also created a non-profit website,
SupraLegrem. Members of the public could observe ongoing variation amongst the
judiciary on asylum cases and use the software to analyse judicial bias in other types
of decisions.
The reaction of the French judiciary was swift. While they had neglected to comment
on the publication sent in advance, they mobilised quickly upon learning of the
website. Benesty was inundated with emails from lower court judges and the judge’s
administrative union published several critical articles. The media appeared to
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largely side with judges, characterising SupraLegrem as aggressive commercial
legal tech akin to Uber.
In 2017, a government-appointed commission on open data recommended legal
reform and in March 2019 the new law came into effect. Article 33 of the Justice
Reform Act now provides that: ‘The identity data of magistrates and members of
the judiciary cannot be reused with the purpose or effect of evaluating, analysing,
comparing or predicting their actual or alleged professional practices.’
A violation of free speech?
The law has been criticised and called a ‘complete shame’ for French democracy.
But the legality of the prohibition has yet to be discussed. As the criminalisation of
judicial behaviour research is clearly an interference with free speech, the question
is whether it is also in violation of human rights law. If we take as a departure
point the right to freedom of expression in Art. 10 in the European Convention on
Human Rights, France must demonstrate that the prohibition has a legitimate aim,
is necessary, and balanced in its impact. We are highly doubtful that the law meets
these standard requirements in a proportionality test.
France can argue that the law has a legitimate aim. The European Court of Human
Rights stated in Prager v. Austria that measures which restrict criticism of individual
judges in order to protect judicial ‘reputation’ and ‘maintain the authority of the
judiciary’ are legitimate (para. 31). The judiciary must be especially protected
‘against destructive attacks that are essentially unfounded’ (para. 34). A case
in point is the reaction of British media to the first Brexit judgment in 2017. The
photos of British High Court judges were splashed across the front page of the
Daily Mail with the headline of ‘Enemies of the People’. This criticism of the judges
was widely criticised as an attack on the independence of the judiciary. In this
context, the French law can easily be presented as seeking to protect the ‘authority
of the judiciary’ (Art. 10 (2) ECHR). French judges also precisely argued that the
publication of statistics with individual names put pressure on them to move towards
the average outcome and thus interferes with judicial independence.
However, France’s restrictions on judicial behaviour research could just as easily
be viewed as an illegitimate aim. It represents an attempt to undermine the rule of
law. The prohibition restricts transparency around judicial decisions, which ultimately
weakens the authority of the courts and judicial reputation. The court and states
have recognised that freedom of expression plays an important role in ‘stimulating
debate on the functioning’ of the system of justice (Prager v. Austria, para. 33)
and that it can constitute ‘public debate capable of furthering progress in human
affairs’ (Giniewski v France, para. 43).
Using publicly available information to scrutinise the behaviour of the court system
and its judges is in that view healthy for any democracy. There is no objective
interest in having a legal system with contradictory case-law and biased judges.
For centuries, legal scholars have seen it as a professional obligation to criticise
judgments that jeopardised the unity of law. Since the advent of democracy at
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least, studying judicial independence has not been viewed as an affront to judicial
independence. And such studies naturally will include analysis as to whether
individual judges are following the law and no other considerations. Scrutinising one
of the institutional pillars of democracy is thus of great public interest and arguably is
pivotal for ‘maintain[ing] the authority of the judiciary’.
Nonetheless, the major problem with the French law is with the other elements of the
test for a violation of free expression. Assuming that the aim of the law is legitimate,
the next question is whether it can be justified as proportionate – is it ‘necessary
in a democratic society’? What is striking about the new French law is its very broad
definition of the punishable use of identities of judges. As noted, it is punishable
to ‘evaluate, analyse, compare or predict’ the behaviour of individual judges. In
other words, any evaluative usage of the data on individual judges is prohibited and
criminalised.
The definition used in the law seems to create a completely new caste of criminals.
The wording covers not just algorithmic analysis for commercial purposes, for
example prediction of case outcomes or use in actual cases, but also all kinds of
other research. It is easy to see how empirical legal studies are covered by this
definition – including multiple studies conducted by the authors of this blog. But it
seems to go even further. In fact, classic doctrinal law which often attributes certain
legal doctrines to specific judges – for example the ‘Warren Court’ – is also covered.
This implies that mainstream legal research as we know it – and have known it for
quite a while – is strikingly close to also being criminalised. It is simply not clear why
such a broad-sweeping law is necessary.
In this respect, the law contravenes an additional requirement in Strasbourg
jurisprudence. Any law authorising interference with the right to free expression must
be drafted with sufficient clarity and detail so that it does not provide ‘unfettered
power’ and operate in unforeseeable and arbitrary ways, i.e. it satisfies typical
rule of law principles (Glas Nadezhda Eood and Elenkov v. Bulgaria, para. 46.).
Moreover, the Court has found it must have adequate and effective safeguards
against abuse’ (ibid), which we cannot identify in the French law.
It is particularly noteworthy that judges in many countries have tolerated such
scrutiny for decades. Beginning in the 1940s, the US academia has developed
specialised research strands into judicial behaviour, which is often cited in the news
media as publicly important information. In Europe, we have seen less of such
scholarship, but there is a growing interest in judicial behaviour with diverse methods
from Norway to Spain that identify systemic divergences between judges. Scholars
of the European Court of Human Rights have used the named dissenting opinions
to assess developments at the court while new machine learning methods have
permitted prediction of outcomes, partially through use of judicial identity.
In France, there is partly a different tradition, which emphasises that the institution
as a whole speaks and without dissenting opinions. Secrecy has in fact been the
trademark of French law and one anthropologist, Bruno Latour, has even argued that
the obscurity of the process of justice in France, is one of its fundamentals. Ensuring
deliberation occurs in the darkness and insisting on courts speaking with one voice
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is arguably also a trademark of the Court of Justice of the EU, a consequence of an
early strong French influence.
There are thus arguments that can be made in favour of prohibiting such analysis.
However, the way in which the French law pursues this purpose is disproportionate,
particularly its blanket prohibition on all forms of research. Moreover, the ‘severity of
the sanction’ is central to a proportionality analysis. The French law’s impact on the
right to free expression seems very heavy-handed when viewed against the aims of
the law.
Finally, although the law is aiming at the French legal system, it is unclear in its
breadth. Does it for example have extraterritorial effects, that is, will it also prohibit
research into international French judges? What does it now take to anonymise
the relevant judges to stay on the safe side of the law? Will we be arrested for
our own quantitative and qualitative research on the behaviour of French judges
in international courts when we step foot in France? The potential threat is not
idle. One of the authors of this blog post has been threatened with defamation
proceedings for publishing an index of investment arbitrators that double hat as legal
counsel.
Conclusion
In an age of fake news and growing authoritarianism, informed critical analysis of
public institutions is essential to both democracy and the rule of law. To be sure,
individual judges must be protected from harassment, and the ultimate responsibility
for ensuring coherence in case-law is the court system itself. However, the French
prohibition seems primarily motivated by a concern with the exposure of variation
and bias in the system rather than protecting judges from needless attack. In
our view, it represents a clear violation of the right to freedom of expression. Its
legitimate aim is doubtful and it covers a startlingly broad array of traditional doctrinal
and empirical research on courts for non-commercial reasons and imposes a heavy
maximum sentence. The land which helped birth the rule of law, l’État de droit,
is now sending a poor signal to other states and courts that wish to avoid public
scrutiny.
The authors thank Lee Bygrave and Jonas Christoffersen for comments on an early
draft and Michael Benisty for fact-checking the blog.
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